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An ontological test of the IAT: Self-activation can increase predictive validity 
 
Abstract 
Extensive research has been conducted demonstrating the predictive validity and 
reliability of the IAT for a broad array of behaviors and contexts. However, less work 
has been done examining its underlying construct validity. This contribution focuses 
on examining whether a core theoretical foundation of the IAT paradigm is valid, 
specifically, whether the IAT effect draws on the Social Knowledge Structure. We 
present four studies within different domains that show that the IAT does indeed 
appear to draw on the SKS. The data show that activation of the self before the 
categorization task enhances the predictive validity of the IAT, as one would expect if 
the IAT reflects the SKS. We discuss theoretical reasons for these findings, with 
emphasis also on underlying statistical/psychometric issues. 
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Implicit measures have achieved a prominent status in psychological research in 
the last few years. The Implicit Association Test (IAT) represents the most popular of 
these measures. Since the original paper in which the IAT was introduced 
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), dozens of studies have applied the 
paradigm to an impressively diverse array of issues (for a review, see Poehlman, 
Uhlmann, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2006). There have been relatively fewer attempts 
investigating the mechanisms underlying the IAT. Moreover, most of the research 
addressing this issue has focused on the specifics of the IAT effect (Rothermund & 
Wentura, 2001), on the influence of confounding effects in the IAT score such as 
words familiarity (Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000) and extra-
personal factors (Olson & Fazio, 2004a), and on the impact of contextual effects on 
IAT scores (Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). In this contribution we will examine 
one of the basic assumptions of the IAT, namely that it reflects associative links in the 
Social Knowledge Structure (SKS; Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, & 
Mellot, 2002).  
The SKS Assumption in the IAT 
The IAT is a double discrimination task used to measure the relative strength of 
the associations between pairs of concepts. Even though it is a relatively new 
paradigm, it has rapidly become a widespread tool in social psychological research. 
The IAT relies on the assumption that, if a target concept and an attribute concept are 
highly associated (congruent), the task will be easier, and therefore quicker, when 
they share the same response key than when they require a different response key (for 
procedural details, see Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The theoretical basis 
of the IAT, and one of its most important assumptions, relies on its tapping into the 
SKS. The SKS is a network of variable-strength associations that correspond to social 
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psychological concepts (self-concept, self-esteem, stereotype, attitude) and attributes 
(Greenwald et al., 2002, p. 5, Figure 1), presumably stored in long-term memory. The 
self is a central entity in the SKS. This centrality is represented by “…its being 
associated with many other concepts that are themselves highly connected in the 
structure” (ib., p. 5).  
The assumption of the SKS is central to the logic of the IAT. It provides both a 
theoretical foundation and a rationale for its capability to predict behaviors. From a 
theoretical point of view, the SKS represents the link between measure and concepts. 
An attitude towards an object is a stored evaluation in memory, relatively stable over 
time, and can be activated automatically (e.g., Fazio, 1990). The SKS therefore 
represents a theoretical bed that accommodates the view of attitudes as associations 
between objects (actions, groups) and valence
1
. From a predictive point of view, an 
IAT should predict some germane behaviors if it genuinely reflects personal 
associations between the relevant target and valence. There is at least one sense in 
which this is an essential requirement. Suppose that the IAT simply reflects specific 
mechanisms underlying the cognitive operations activated by the task. The ranking of 
individuals in the resulting IAT score should therefore be affected only by individual 
differences in the operation of such mechanisms (method variance), for instance, 
stimulus-response compatibility or task-switching costs (e.g. Mierke & Klauer, 2003). 
However, it is unclear how individual differences in task switching costs, for 
example, could predict specific behaviors such as condom use or food choice.  
To sum up, a focus on predictive validity appears not only informative about the 
pragmatic value of the IAT, but also important in terms of its theoretical foundations, 
namely the SKS assumption. 
The Mechanism of Self-activation 
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Self-activation can be defined as the cognitive activation of any kind of self-
related knowledge; it does not necessarily require conscious awareness, and it is 
characterized by a general heightened state of accessibility of self-related knowledge 
(Stapel & Tesser, 2001, p. 743). The constructs of self-focus and self-awareness are 
often used interchangeably with the concept of self-activation. It has been proposed 
that they should be distinguished from self-activation, mainly because the latter does 
not require reflective conscious self-attentiveness (Stapel & Tesser, 2001, footnote 1, 
p. 743). While the argument put forward appears compelling, an inspection of the 
actual use of the terms in published research produces a far less clear picture. 
Experimental manipulations that would seem indistinguishable in terms of conscious 
activation, are labeled as self-focus, self-awareness, or self-activation manipulations 
in different contributions (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 2000; Macrae, 
Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998). Here we will refer to the term self-activation in its 
generic sense and sidestep these more subtle differences that in practice seem as much 
real as a question of semantics.  
Self-activation typically results from an experimental manipulation that renders 
self-related cognitions especially salient or accessible. The consequences of this 
increased accessibility can be diverse. For instance, it has been shown that self-
activation increases social comparison (Stapel & Tesser, 2001), the efficiency of self-
regulatory processes (Carver & Scheier, 1981), the attitude-behavior consistency 
(Pryor, Gibbons, Wicklund, Fazio, & Hood, 1977), and decreases stereotyping 
(Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998). On a different but relevant stream of 
research, it has been shown that individuals high in self-consciousness, characterized 
by chronically higher accessibility of self-related knowledge, are particularly sensitive 
to experimental manipulations such as subliminal priming used to instigate automatic 
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non-conscious behavior (Hull, Slone, Meteyer and Matthews, 2002). Whilst the 
specific consequences of self-activation can be diverse and also probably influenced 
by the demands of the subsequent task, the mechanism is pretty much the same. Self-
activation increases the accessibility of self-relevant thoughts and constructs. This 
affects subsequent activities in the direction of the thoughts and constructs that are 
momentarily more accessible. 
Testing the SKS Assumption via Self-activation 
The links between the IAT, the SKS, and self-activation should be apparent at 
this point. To summarize, the IAT is a task of which the outcome depends on the 
difference in speed of the motor actions (i.e., movement of the index finger) needed to 
categorize correctly and which is reflected in different response latencies. This 
response speed is critically influenced by the relative ease or difficulty in activating 
the necessary motor command. This relative ease or difficulty, in turn, depends on the 
strength of the associations between the two pairs of concepts that might interfere or 
facilitate the use of the same response key. The strength of these associations is 
reflected in the SKS. Self-activation increases the accessibility of self-related thoughts 
and concepts. Therefore, it should follow that an IAT completed immediately after a 
self-activation manipulation should better reflect the SKS and, as a consequence, an 
IAT score so obtained should be more predictive of actual behavior, as it contains a 
relatively greater proportion of valid variance (variance that reflects the SKS).  
Overview of the Studies 
In sum, our key hypothesis is that self-activation should increase the predictive 
validity of the IAT. This prediction relies on an important assumption underlying the 
IAT, namely that it reflects concepts and valences as stored in the SKS. We present 
four studies that test this hypothesis. Study 1 concerns attitudes toward alcohol, Study 
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2 focuses on attitudes toward academic disciplines and includes students from Arts 
and from Science departments, Study 3 examines attitudes toward junk food, and 
Study 4 is about attitudes towards Americans. The key criteria to be predicted are 
self-reported behaviors (Study 1 and 3), group membership (Study 2) and actual 
behaviors in the form of judgments (Study 4). The results show that across attitudes, 
behaviors, and manipulations, self-activation increases the predictive validity of the 
IAT. 
Study 1: Alcohol 
Drinking alcohol is a relatively common behavior. The most recent national 
survey in the United Kingdom estimated that adults aged 14 and over drink on 
average 11.3 units of alcohol per week (Institute of Alcohol Studies, 2005). Some 
studies have applied the IAT (or modifications of it) to the issue of drinking alcohol 
with promising results (for a review, see Wiers, Houben, Smulders, Conrod, & Jones, 
2005). For instance, Wiers, Van Worden, Smulders, and De Jong (2002) found a 
significant relationship (r=.37) between a standard valence IAT and a composite index 
of alcohol use. Typically, the studies have focused on predicting some kind of 
composite index of alcohol consumption rather than a consumption index of alcohol 
relative to soft drinks, even when the IAT measure has been defined using a contrast 
category of soft-drinks. Therefore, whereas there is some empirical evidence of 
predictive validity of an IAT for alcohol consumption, little is known to what extent it 
can predict a relative preference over soft-drinks consumption. The first study 
explores this issue and tests the key hypothesis that self-activation will increase the 
predictive validity of the IAT. 
Method 
Participants. The sample consisted of 60 participants, 27 males and 33 females, 
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with an average age of 26.2 years (SD=5). Of these, 48 (80%) were successfully re-
contacted by e-mail after one week to obtain a second behavioral measure. The 
participants were predominantly university students and were contacted on campus or 
through informal networks. 
Design and Procedure. The design was a simple 2-condition between-subjects 
factor. Participants were told that they would be completing two experiments and 
were randomly allocated to either a self-activation or a neutral condition. Each 
participant was tested individually with a laptop in different locations. Care was taken 
that during the experiment no external distractions or noises were present. The first 
experiment was presented as a pilot study on proofreading and word-search whereas 
the second was a study about their preferences towards different types of drinks. The 
first experiment was actually the self-activation manipulation, modeled after Brewer 
and Gardner (1996) and used in other studies on self activation (Stapel & Tesser, 
2001)
2
. Participants were asked to read paragraphs describing a trip to a city and to 
circle certain words within two minutes. The text was identical, but the words to be 
encircled were different in the two conditions. In the self-activation condition, the 
words were “I”, “me”, “my”, and “myself”, whereas in the neutral condition the 
words were “the” and “a”. In both cases there were 19 such words. Participants were 
then asked to perform the next tasks at a laptop with a 14.1-inch display set at a 
resolution of 1024 x 758, color depth set at 16 bit and refresh rate at 72Hz. The tasks 
were programmed with Inquisit (version 1.33). 
First, participants completed an IAT on alcohol vs. soft drinks. Our 
implementation of the IAT followed the established format of seven steps (cf. 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji, 2003). The 
target category pairing was Alcoholic drinks (beer, wine, whisky, lager, cider) and 
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Soft drinks (coke, pepsi, fanta, sprite, juices) whereas the attribute categories were 
Pleasant (happy, smile, joy, peace, pleasure) and Unpleasant (pain, death, poison, 
agony, vomit). There were 20 practice trials for the non-critical steps (steps 1, 2, and 
5), 20 steps for the training stage of the critical pairs (steps 3 and 6), and 60 trials 
(plus two dummy initial trials that were discarded) for the critical steps 4 and 7. The 
stimuli were presented in a random order for all participants. The order of steps 3-4 
and 6-7 was fixed for all participants, with Alcoholic drinks paired with Pleasant in 
step 3-4 and with Unpleasant in step 6-7. Participants were asked to press the left key 
(letter d) or the right key (letter k) depending on the category of the stimulus. An error 
message consisting of an acoustic beep was delivered upon incorrect classification. 
The inter-trial interval was 400 ms.  
Participants were then asked their explicit attitude, first, towards drinking 
alcohol and, then, soft drinks. They responded to the stem “I think that to drink 
alcohol (soft drinks) is for me:” followed by 7 semantic differential pairs of adjectives 
(bad-good, foolish-wise, unpleasant-pleasant, negative-positive, unenjoyable-
enjoyable, unhealthy-healthy, unattractive-attractive) on a 7-point scale. Next, 
participants completed a self-reported behavioral grid asking them to report how 
many units of alcoholic and soft drinks they usually consumed for each day of an 
average week. The concept of a unit of alcohol is commonly used in the UK and 
corresponds to specified approximated quantities of different types of alcoholic 
drinks. For instance, one unit of alcohol corresponds to a small, 125 ml. glass of wine, 
half a pint (i.e., 284 ml) of beer/cider/lager, and a standard measure (25 ml.) of spirits 
(e.g., whisky). To further reduce idiosyncratic reporting, a small legend reported the 
units corresponding to each alcoholic and soft drink. The list of alcoholic drinks 
included beer, wine, lager, spirits, cider, alcopops, and other alcoholic drinks, whereas 
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the list of soft drinks included Coke/Pepsi, lemonade, juices, and other soft drinks. 
Finally, participants were thanked for their participation and were informed that there 
would be a brief final part of the experiment in one week. They were asked for an e-
mail contact address. After one week, participants were sent the previously described 
self-reported drinking grid and asked for their drinking behavior in the previous, 
rather than an average, week.  
Data analysis strategy. The same data analysis strategy was used in the four studies. 
We first inspected the psychometric properties of the measures and report relevant 
descriptive aspects of the data. Next, a regression approach was adopted, centering 
variables before calculating interaction terms to reduce unessential multicollinearity 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). To test the key hypothesis of increased 
predictive validity of the IAT under self-activation manipulation, we ran regressions 
in which each dependent variable in the study was predicted by the IAT score, the 
experimental condition (dummy coded as 0=control and 1=self-activation), and their 
interaction. The first order effect term for the IAT would reflect the slope of the 
regression line in the control condition. A positive significant interaction term would 
signal a successful test of the hypothesis, indicating that the IAT score has higher 
predictivity in the self-activation condition. The interaction was further probed by 
reversing the dummy coding to inspect the effect of the IAT in the self-activation 
group (Aiken & West, 1991).  
To establish whether the hypothesized effect was unique to the IAT, three 
additional sets of regressions were conducted
3
. The first set tested whether the same 
effect was present for explicit attitudes. The independent variables were therefore the 
explicit attitude score, the experimental condition, and their interaction. The lack of a 
significant interaction term in the latter regression set would signal that self-activation 
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works uniquely with the IAT. The second regression set tested the possibility that the 
interaction between the IAT and the self-activation condition is due to the shared 
variance between the implicit and the explicit measures. If that is the case, the effect 
should vanish if the explicit attitude measure is included in the equation. In other 
words, we tested whether the moderation effect is mediated or suppressed by the 
explicit attitudinal measure. Finally, the third set tested the specific issue of whether 
self-activation increases the correspondence between implicit and explicit measures of 
attitude. The regression therefore included the explicit attitude score as the dependent 
variable and the IAT score, the experimental condition, and their interaction as the 
independent variables. The lack of a significant interaction term would suggest that 
self-activation does not simultaneously increase the salience of propositional (i.e., 
explicit) and associative (i.e., implicit) associations. Taken together, once the 
presence of a significant effect of self-activation on the predictive validity of the IAT 
is established, these three additional analyses should clarify the extent to which the 
self-activation manipulation works primarily or uniquely at an implicit level.  
Results and Discussion 
The IAT score was calculated with the algorithm D (deletion of latencies below 
400ms, errors replaced with the mean of the correct responses plus 600ms) developed 
by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003), included all the 80 trials (20 practice and 60 
test), and was calculated such that the practice and test stages had a weight 
proportional to the number of trials included in each (in this case 25% and 75%, 
respectively). The reliability of the IAT score was good (=. 80). It was obtained by 
calculating 80 IAT scores (one for each pair of trials) and using them as items. The 
IAT score was computed such that higher scores expressed an implicit preference 
towards alcoholic over soft drinks. The attitude score was calculated as the difference 
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between the sums of the semantic differentials, with positive scores indicating a 
preference for alcohol over soft drinks, and showed good reliability (=. 90). The 
correlation between implicit and explicit attitudes was not significant (r=.16, p=.234). 
The means of the measures for the two groups (self-activation vs. control) for all four 
studies are reported in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The groups did not differ in their explicit (t(58)=0.45, p=.652) and implicit 
attitudes (t(58)=0.04, p=.970). Mean units of drinks in an average week and in the last 
week varied between 8.9 (soft drinks, average week) and 11.7 (alcohol, average 
week). The two groups (self-activation vs. control) did not differ in terms of drinking 
behavior (all p‟s >.45). These results suggest that the assignment was effectively 
random. Two indices of relative preference for drinking alcohol (positive values) or 
soft drinks (negative values) was calculated by subtracting the total amount of units of 
soft drinks from those of alcohol, both for an average week and the previous week. 
The two indices were correlated significantly (r=.52) and aggregated in an overall 
index of relative alcohol consumption
4
. 
The multiple regression to test the key hypothesis explained 21.3% of the 
variance, with a significant effect of the experimental condition (=.58, p=.039) 
crucially qualified by the expected significant interaction (=.57, p=.029). The IAT 
was not a significant predictor in the control condition (β=-.09, p=.586) whereas it 
significantly predicted the drinking alcohol index in the self-activation condition 
(=.48, p=.017). The two simple slopes are presented in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
A second set of regressions ascertained that the effect was not present for 
explicit attitudes. The drinking index was significantly and strongly predicted by 
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explicit attitudes (=.54, p<.001), but the interaction term with the experimental 
condition was not significant (=.18, p<.459).  
The third set of regressions showed that explicit attitudes mediated or 
suppressed the self-activation effect on the IAT. In fact, the inclusion of the explicit 
attitudes as a predictor (=.47, p=.001) rendered the interaction term IAT x 
Experimental condition no longer significant (=.30, p=.209).  
Finally, we tested whether the correlation between IAT and explicit attitudes 
changed as a function of the self-activation condition. The results showed that the 
interaction term involving IAT and experimental condition was significant (=.58, 
p=.033). IAT and explicit attitudes were not significantly correlated in the control 
condition (=-.09, p=.596) and significantly associated in the self-activation condition 
(=.49, p=.020). 
The results provide initial support for the idea that self-activation increases the 
predictive validity of an IAT measure. In fact, under the condition of self-activation, 
the IAT predicts the relative preference for drinking alcohol over soft-drinks, whereas 
it does not under the control condition. The additional analyses qualified the effect. 
Although the self-activation effect was not present for explicit attitudes, they 
mediated or suppressed the self-activation effect on the IAT. Finally, explicit attitudes 
and IAT were significantly correlated under the self-activation condition. Taken 
together these results suggest that the self-activation manipulation simultaneously 
enhanced both propositional and associative structures concerning preferences for 
alcohol and soft drinks. Therefore, while self-activation has an effect on the validity 
of the IAT, this effect seems to be driven by an enhanced salience of germane 
propositional evaluations. 
Study 2: Arts vs. Science 
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The type of studies students choose to pursue at University level is an important 
definer of their professional future as well as becoming part of their personal identity. 
Several reasons underlie what kinds of studies are pursued, including career 
perspectives and financial success. One of the key reasons is their liking of the type of 
study that they will pursue. It is reasonable to expect that a student who has chosen to 
study History, for example, has a stronger preference for arts over science and, 
conversely, that a student who has chosen Computer Science has a stronger 
preference for science over arts. This simple argument can be extended to implicit 
measures like the IAT. Nosek, Banaji, and Greenwald (2002) demonstrated that 
students, especially women, generally have an implicit preference for arts over 
science. However, the main focus of the authors was on the stereotypic association 
between male and science and female and arts and not on the preference of arts 
students for arts and science students for science. In this study we will investigate this 
latter issue and test whether self-activation can increase the validity of the 
corresponding IAT measure.  
Method 
Participants. The sample consisted of 72 participants, 30 males and 42 females, with 
an average age of 24.6 years (SD=5.6, two missing values). Participants came from a 
range of departments classified either as Arts or Science. The most represented 
departments for arts in the participant pool were Language and Linguistics (10), 
History (9), and Literature (6) and, for science, Biology (12), Computer Science (10), 
and Electronics (9). 
Design and Procedure. An equal number of participants from Arts and from Science 
departments was randomly allocated to either self-activation or neutral conditions. 
Participants were tested in individual cubicles in the laboratory. The instructions 
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mirrored the ones in the first study. After the self-activation task, they completed an 
IAT on Arts vs. Science. The IAT had the same format as in Study 1, with the 
following exceptions. 
First, the display was 15-inches and participants responded by use of a Cedrus 
response box (model RB-730). Second, the IAT was counterbalanced for steps 3-4 
and 6-7 (approximately half the participants had Arts paired with positive in step 3-4 
and Science paired with positive in step 6-7, and half had the opposite sequence). 
Third, the error message in the IAT consisted of a red cross displayed below the 
stimulus and stayed on the screen until participants pressed the correct answer (built-
in error penalty). Fourth, the number of trials in the non-critical steps was slightly 
lower (16 instead of 20). The paired target category of Arts had History, Philosophy, 
Literature, Language, and Art History as exemplars while the Science exemplars were 
Biochemistry, Mathematics, Electronics, Computer Science, and Biology. The 
attribute categories were positive (good, life, pleasure, pretty, friend) and negative 
(evil, death, pain, ugly, enemy).  
Next, participants were asked their explicit attitudes towards, first, science and, 
then, arts. They were presented with the stem “I think that scientific (artistic) 
disciplines are:” followed by six semantic differential pairs of adjectives (bad-good, 
negative-positive, unenjoyable-enjoyable, boring-exciting, unattractive-attractive, 
worthless-worthwhile) with the same 7-point scale as in the first study. Finally, 
participants were thanked for their participation, debriefed and paid. 
Results and Discussion 
The IAT score was calculated with the algorithm D for built-in error penalties 
and it showed good reliability (=.93). It was computed such that higher scores 
expressed an implicit preference towards Arts over Science. The explicit attitude 
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score was calculated as the difference between the sums of the semantic differentials 
with the same direction (=.90). Implicit and explicit attitudes were significantly 
correlated (r=.50, p<.001). The self-activation group did not differ from the control 
group in terms of explicit (t(70)=0.57, p=.570) and implicit (t(70)=0.01, p=.989) 
attitudes. 
The main analysis involved a logistic regression with group membership as the 
dependent variable and IAT, experimental condition, and the interaction term as 
independent variables. The order of presentation within the IAT (Arts-Positive first 
vs. last) was included as a covariate in the analysis to partial out its effects (cf. 
Perugini & Gallucci, 2006). The equation explained 57.7% of variance (Nagelkerke 
R2). There was a main effect of order (B=-2.23, p=.008)
5
 and no effect for the 
experimental condition (B=-0.63, p=.445), whereas the IAT was a significant 
predictor (B=1.48, p=.005). Crucially, this effect was qualified by a borderline 
significant interaction between the IAT and the self-activation condition (B=2.72, 
p=.051). The interaction is graphically depicted in Figure 2.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
While in both conditions the IAT predicts well the probability of being a student 
of Arts or Science faculties, it does so better in the self-activation condition, as can be 
evinced by the steeper slope of the curve. Expressing the results differently, the 
correlation between group membership and IAT scores was r=.36 (p=.030) in the 
control condition and increased to r=.76 (p<.001) in the self-activation condition. 
A second logistic regression ascertained whether the same moderation effect 
can be found for explicit attitudes. Explicit attitudes had a significant main effect 
(B=1.63, p=.008), meaning that students of arts had a better explicit evaluation of arts 
than science students (M=1.44 vs. M=-0.78). However, this effect was not qualified 
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by a significant interaction (B=2.48, p=.118). A third logistic regression inspected the 
role of explicit attitudes as a potential mediator of the moderation effect of self-
activation on the IAT. Explicit attitudes significantly predicted group membership 
B=2.15, p=.003) but did not affect the interaction term IAT x experimental condition 
(B=3.65, p=.030). Finally, the correlation between implicit and explicit attitudes was 
not greater in the self-activation condition, as evidenced by a non significant 
interaction term in the appropriate multiple regression (=-.00, p=.984).  
The results therefore confirm the key finding of the first study. Under conditions 
of self-activation, the IAT was a better predictor of group membership. Moreover, 
unlike in the first study, the effect here was shown to be unique to the IAT. 
Specifically, it was not found for explicit attitudes, explicit attitudes did not mediate 
the effect, and the correlation between implicit and explicit attitudes was not affected 
by the self-activation manipulation.  
Study 3: Junk food 
Morgan Spurlock achieved international headlines with his movie “Supersize 
Me” in 2004. The movie revolves around the adverse health effects of eating junk 
food by illustrating what happens to the protagonist – Morgan Spurlock – as he goes 
through a month of eating “super-sized” McDonald‟s products such as hamburgers 
and cheeseburgers. The international success of the movie was also due to increasing 
concerns in Western societies about the negative effects of eating junk food. Obesity, 
one of the key consequences of an unhealthy diet, now is considered as one of the 
biggest killers and a public health priority in several countries. Two studies with 
contrasting results are relevant. Maison, Greenwald and Bruin (2001) investigated in a 
sample of women whether an IAT with high vs. low calorie food-item categories 
predicts eating behavior and found a significant positive relation (r=.34). However, it 
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should be noted that their dependent variable was based on generic self-reported 
statements (e.g., “I always eat what I want”, “When I buy something, I am always 
concerned about calories”) rather than on more specific patterns of eating habits. In 
contrast, Roefs and Jensen (2002) used an IAT with high vs. low fat categories and 
found that obese people have a significantly more negative implicit attitude towards 
high fat food than normal weight people, therefore implying a negative relation 
between IAT and eating behavior. In this study we will investigate a similar issue, 
focusing, however, on the categories junk vs. healthy food and with the basic 
hypothesis that self-activation will increase the predictive validity of the IAT. 
Method 
Participants. The sample consisted of 60 participants, 35 males and 25 females, with 
an average age of 27.0 years (SD=6.1). One participant failed to answer the questions 
concerning his/her diet and therefore was not included in the critical analyses. 
Design and Procedure. Participants were randomly allocated to either a self-
activation or a neutral condition and told that there were two experiments. The first 
experiment, presented as a pilot study, was a paper and pencil version of Silvia‟s self-
novelty manipulation (2002), slightly modified for the purposes of this study. 
Participants in the self-activation condition were asked to answer three questions 
aimed at explaining what makes them unique as individuals. The questions asked 
about what makes them different from their family, from their friends, and from their 
colleagues, respectively. Participants in the control condition were asked to write 
about one of their university classes and to describe the last time they went out to 
watch a movie. In both conditions they were provided with an empty box of about 2/5 
of an A4 page in which to write their responses. This manipulation has been shown to 
be a valid manipulation of self-focused attention (Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003; Silvia & 
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Eichstaedt, 2004). After the self-novelty manipulation, participants performed an IAT 
on Junk vs. Healthy food, with the same procedure and number of trials as in Study 2. 
The exemplars for the target category of Junk food were burger, chips, doughnut, 
fried breakfast, and chocolate bars while the Healthy food exemplars were salad, 
vegetables, cereal breakfast, fruits, and yoghurt. The attribute categories were positive 
(rainbow, happy, smile, joy, peace) and negative (pain, death, poison, agony, 
sickness). Participants were then asked their explicit attitude towards junk and healthy 
food. The format for the attitude question was the same as in the two previous studies, 
followed by seven semantic differential adjective pairs (bad-good, foolish-wise, 
unpleasant-pleasant, negative-positive, unenjoyable-enjoyable, unhealthy-healthy, 
unattractive-attractive) on a 7-point scale. Finally, participants were asked to report 
their eating habits in a usual week. The focus was on foods that are typically included 
in an Unhealthy vs. Healthy diet. Specifically, they were asked to indicate how many 
servings a week they had of a series of products. Once completed, they were thanked 
and debriefed. 
For the composite of Unhealthy diet the items were: sausages or beefburgers; 
beef, pork or lamb; bacon, meat pie, processed meat; any fried food (including cooked 
breakfast) [all in a 5 step scale: none, < 1, 1 to 2, 3 to 5, 6 or more]. For the composite 
of Healthy diet they were: Breakfast cereals a) Sugared type: e.g., Frosties, Coco 
Pops; Rice or Corn type: e.g., Corn Flakes, Special K; b) Porridge or Ready Brek; 
Wheat type: e.g., Weetabix, Fruit „n‟ Fibre; Muesli type: Alpen, Jordan‟s; c) Bran 
type: All-Bran, Bran Flakes, Sultana Bran [all in a 5 step scale: none, < 1, 1 to 2, 3 to 
5, 6 or more]; Fruit: fresh, frozen or canned [in a 7 step scale: none, <1, 1 to 2, 3 to 5, 
6 to 7, 8 to 11, >12].  
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The items were standardized, averaged within the type of diet, and then a 
composite index of Unhealthy Eating was created by subtracting the Healthy from the 
Unhealthy diet. 
Results and Discussion 
The IAT showed good reliability (=. 85). The IAT score was computed such 
that higher scores expressed an implicit preference towards junk over healthy food. 
The explicit attitude score was calculated as the difference between the sums of the 
semantic differentials in the same direction (=.80). The two measures were not 
significantly correlated (r=.21, p=.110). Neither the explicit (t(57)=0.34, p=.735) nor 
the implicit (t(57)=1.04, p=.305) attitudes of the self-activation group differed from 
those of the control group. The Unhealthy Eating index also did not differ across 
conditions (t(57)=0.41, p=.678). 
A multiple regression was performed on the Unhealthy Eating index with the 
order of presentation within the IAT, the IAT score, the experimental condition, and 
the interaction between IAT and experimental condition as independent variables. The 
regression explained 10.1% of the variance. The order of presentation (=-.02, 
p=.925) and the experimental condition (=.10, p=.634) were not significant whereas, 
crucially, the interaction term between IAT and experimental condition was 
significant (=.47, p=.048, see Figure 3). The IAT significantly predicted unhealthy 
eating in the self-activation (=.30, p=.043) but not in the control condition (=-.17, 
p=.412). 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
The influence of the self-activation manipulation did not generalize to explicit 
attitudes. Explicit attitudes did not significantly predict the unhealthy eating (=.06, 
p=.695) and, crucially, the interaction term with the experimental condition was not 
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significant (=.19, p=.395). Moreover, the moderation effect of self-activation on the 
IAT did not vanish when explicit attitudes were included in the regression equation 
(=.51, p=.031). Finally, the correlation between implicit and explicit attitudes was 
not moderated by self-activation, as reflected in a non-significant interaction term 
between IAT and experimental manipulation in predicting the explicit attitude score 
(=-.28, p=.321). The results of this third study fully parallel those of the second 
study. The analyses showed that self-activation increases the predictive validity of the 
IAT. A different manipulation of self-activation has proven as effective as the one 
used in the first two studies. Moreover, the effect has been shown to be exclusive to 
the associative structures that are reflected in an implicit measure like the IAT. 
Study 4: Afro-Caribbean stereotype 
Whether the IAT is more predictive when the self-related knowledge structures 
are activated depends also on exactly what is activated. An important question 
therefore concerns boundary conditions of the self-activation manipulation. We 
believe that there are such conditions and one of these concerns stereotype activation. 
There is evidence that heightened self-focus can lead to spontaneous suppression of 
stereotypic thoughts through automatic activation of inhibitory thoughts (Macrae, 
Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998). An implication of this is that self-activation may not 
increase the validity of a paradigm like the IAT when the content is stereotype-
related. Therefore, if an IAT on stereotype-related content (e.g., a race IAT) were 
used to predict some prejudiced behaviors or choices, one could expect that under 
conditions of self-activation its predictive validity may not increase (or may even 
actually decrease) because of the inhibitory thoughts that can be automatically 
activated. Inhibitory thoughts can be considered as one of the suppression factors that 
are involved in the chain from stereotype to action (e.g., Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). 
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However, not everybody engages in inhibitory thoughts when faced with a situation 
that activates a stereotype. 
One of the most widely validated scales to measure individual differences in the 
activation of control mechanisms (i.e. inhibitory thoughts) is the Motivation to 
Control Prejudiced Reactions (MCPR, Dunton & Fazio, 1997). The MCPR is 
composed of two main dimensions, concern with acting prejudiced and restraint to 
avoid dispute. Both dimensions have been shown to moderate the relationship 
between automatically activated racial attitudes and the expression of prejudice 
(Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2003). The first dimension seems 
particularly relevant for our study (see below). The concern with acting prejudiced 
dimension is strongly related to egalitarianism and implies a particular concern 
toward negative biases against historically disadvantaged groups such as Blacks 
(Olson & Fazio, 2004b). Given that the goal of individuals who are high in concern 
with acting prejudiced is to treat such disadvantaged people more favorably, they may 
be inclined toward positive judgments and, hence, may over-correct for any negativity 
that they experience. It follows that for persons who are high in concern, self-
activation should simultaneously activate stereotypic and inhibitory/control thoughts, 
therefore counteracting each other. In contrast, for persons who are low in concern, 
only stereotypic thoughts will be activated and the IAT should be more predictive of 
stereotypic-related actions. 
The key hypothesis, therefore, is that self-activation will increase the predictive 
validity of the IAT, but only for people who are low in concern with acting 
prejudiced. This hypothesis would be confirmed if the corresponding interaction term 
between IAT, experimental manipulation, and concern is significant.  
Ontological test of the IAT   23 
 
To test this idea, we focused on the Afro-Caribbean stereotype. In the United 
Kingdom, the white population has generally a negative stereotype of Afro-Caribbean 
people. Afro-Caribbeans are usually judged as more dangerous, less friendly, less 
competent, and more likely to be involved in criminal acts than white people or other 
ethnic minority groups, such as Chinese. Besides anecdotal evidence and survey 
studies, the stereotype is reflected in how the English police deal with Afro-Caribbean 
people. According to official statistics, Afro-Caribbean people are 6 times more likely 
to be stopped and searched by the police than are white people (Home Office, 2005).  
Method 
Participants. The sample consisted of 39 White university students. One participant 
was excluded from the analyses because the pattern of the IAT revealed a high 
number of rapid responses (27.5% trials <300ms) and a large proportion of errors 
(29.4%), indicating random responding. The final sample size was thus composed of 
38 participants
6
.  
Design and Procedure. Participants were randomly allocated to self-activation or 
control conditions. They first completed the paper and pencil version of Silvia‟s self-
novelty manipulation, with the same procedure as in Study 3. Following this 
manipulation, participants completed an IAT comparing relative preference for Afro-
Caribbeans vs. Chinese. The IAT had the same procedure and format of Studies 2 and 
3, except that it included 20 trials for the non-critical steps and for the practice stage 
of the critical steps. The exemplars for the Afro-Caribbean target category were 
typical names of Afro-Caribbean men (Leroy, Carlton, Winston, Tyrese, Denzil).  The 
exemplars for the Chinese target category were typical names of Chinese men (Chen, 
Yuan, Ming, Hsin, Chung). The attribute categories were positive (rainbow, love, gift, 
joy, pleasure) and negative (vomit, death, evil, agony, cancer).   
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Participants then responded to six items assessing personal attitudes towards 
first Afro-Caribbean people and then towards Chinese people.  Each item took the 
format, “In your opinion, how _______ are Afro-Caribbean (Chinese) people?” and 
included in turn the adjectives: competent, capable, efficient, friendly, well-
intentioned, warm. These six adjectives were chosen as markers of the two 
dimensions of competence and warmth (see below).  
Next, participants read a hypothetical case study adapted from Bodenhausen 
(1988): „On Saturday 20th November a man was physically assaulted in an alleyway 
in North London. The victim, a young man in his twenties, claimed that he was 
followed down the alleyway and attacked from behind. After a brief struggle it is 
claimed that the victim was knocked to the floor and the victim was punched and 
kicked a number of times before the defendant escaped with his wallet and mobile 
phone.‟  Participants then read 12 items of evidence (pre-tested with a pilot study) 
consisting of both incriminating and acquitting evidence so as to make the case 
ambiguous overall (e.g., the defendant‟s ex-girlfriend testified that she had spent time 
in the bar flirting with the victim and had made plans to meet him later; no 
eyewitnesses could positively identify the attacker;). Participants were asked to rate 
how guilty they believed the defendant to be along an 11-point scale (definitely not 
guilty-definitely guilty).   
However, before reading the hypothetical case study, all participants completed 
a masked primed lexical decision task (MPLD) designed to prime participants with 
the concept Afro-Caribbean. This was necessary in order to activate in a subtle way 
the Afro-Caribbean stereotype. The MPLD consisted of two blocks. The first block 
was presented as practice trials and consisted of 10 trials. The second block was 
presented as test trials and contained 38 trials.  Each trial required participants to 
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decide as quickly as possible whether each letter string represented a word or 
nonword. There were 8 target words (tree, chair, circle, number, flower, button, 
square, insect) and 8 pronounceable nonwords (larik, kutred, bengarst, garifu, hustip, 
finzarit, vugerab, sitab). Within each trial, the target word was preceded by a fixation 
cross (that appeared for 1 second) that was replaced by a prime word (either an Afro-
Caribbean name, Winston or Tyrese; or a neutral word, Neutral or Table) appearing 
for 42ms then followed by a mask (a row of XXXXXXXX that was longer in length 
than any primes or targets) that lasted on-screen for 681ms. There was an inter-trial 
interval of 100ms between the participant‟s response to the target and the onset of the 
next trial denoted by the presentation of the fixation cross. Participants were primed 
with an Afro-Caribbean name on 8 out of 10 practice trials and 24 out of 38 test trials.  
After reading the hypothetical scenario and making a judgment of guilt, 
participants completed a 12-item stereotype scale for both Afro-Caribbean people and 
Chinese people, adapted from the Stereotype Content Model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, 
Glick, & Xu, 2002) that proposes two main dimensions of competence and warmth.  
Each item took the form: “As viewed by society, how _______ are Afro-Caribbean 
(Chinese) people?” along 5-point scales ranging from „not at all‟ to „extremely‟. 
Twelve adjectives were used to assess competence (competent, confident, capable, 
efficient, intelligent, skillful) and warmth (friendly, well-intentioned, trustworthy, 
warm, good-natured, sincere). Then, participants completed the Concern with acting 
prejudiced sub-scale of the Motivation to Control Prejudice Reactions, comprising 9 
items (e.g., „I get angry with myself when I have a thought or feeling that might be 
considered prejudiced‟) along 6-point rating scales (strongly disagree-strongly agree). 
Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their time.    
Results and Discussion 
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The IAT score was calculated, as with the previous studies, using a weighted D 
algorithm and it showed good internal reliability (α=.84). Higher scores reflected 
positive implicit preference for Afro-Caribbean people. Explicit measures of personal 
and societal racial views were calculated as difference scores between the sums of the 
scales in the same direction (Afro-Caribbean minus Chinese: personal competence, 
PC: α=.69; personal warmth, PW: α=.77; societal competence, SC: α=.69; societal 
warmth, SW: α=.83).    
The IAT was not significantly correlated with any of the explicit measures (PC: 
r=.11; PW: r=.09; SC: r=.15; SW: r=.22) including Concern (r=-.16). Neither the 
explicit (PC: t(36)=0.92, p=.364; PW: t(36)=1.21, p=.234; SC: t(36)=0.14, p=.893; 
SW: t(36)=-0.39, p=.699) nor the implicit (t(36)=-1.03, p=.312) measures of the self-
activation group differed from those of the control group. Furthermore, there was no 
difference in Concern scores across these groups (t(36)=-1.06, p=.297).  
A multiple regression was performed on the guilt judgment with the IAT order 
of presentation, IAT score, experimental condition, concern with acting prejudiced, 
the two-way interactions between IAT, experimental condition, and Concern, and the 
relative three-way interaction as independent variables. The regression explained 
29.9% of the variance. The order of presentation (=.03, p=.921), the IAT (=-.05, 
p=.780) and the experimental condition (=.13, p=.474) were not significant. There 
was a main effect of Concern (=.40, p=.054). None of the two-way interactions 
emerged (IAT x self-activation: =-.12, p=.537; IAT x Concern: =.07, p=.773; self-
activation x Concern: =-.30, p=.150).  Crucially, the three-way interaction term 
between IAT, experimental condition, and Concern was significant (=.60, p=.022). 
An inspection of the three-way interaction revealed that, within the self-activation 
condition, there was a marginally significant interaction between IAT and Concern 
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(=.72, p=.062). Simple slopes analyses revealed that when Concern was low, 
implicit preference for Afro-Caribbeans was significantly negatively correlated with 
ratings of a guilty judgment (B=-.80,, S.E.=0.32, t=-2.47, p=.026).  At intermediate 
(B=-.08, S.E.=0.24, t=-0.33, p=.749) and high levels of Concern (B=0.64, S.E.=0.52, 
t=1.23, p=0.236), IAT scores were unrelated to guilty ratings. There was no 
significant interaction between IAT and Concern in the control condition (= -.51, 
p=.147). According to the simple slopes analysis, implicit preference for Afro-
Caribbeans was unrelated to ratings of guilt when concern was low, moderate or 
strong (all p>.215). The simple slopes of the interactions are depicted in Figure 4.    
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
To recapitulate, under self-activation, a negative implicit preference for Afro-
Caribbean was highly predictive of greater guilt judgment, but only for those 
individuals who are not concerned with acting in a prejudiced manner--and thus do 
not engage in inhibitory thoughts--as hypothesized.  
The influence of the self-activation manipulation was not present for any of the 
four explicit indices (PC, PW, SC, SW). Although there was a significant main effect 
of SW (β=-.40, p=.040) suggesting that those with more negative views of Afro-
Caribbeans judged the defendant as more guilty, there were no significant two-way 
interactions between self-activation and the explicit measures (all p‟s >.148) or three-
way interaction involving Concern (all p‟s >.319). Moreover, the three-way 
interaction between self-activation, IAT and Concern not only did not vanish when 
the explicit indices were included in the regression equation, but actually became 
marginally stronger (for PC: β=.68, p=.006; for PW: β=.69, p=.012; for SC: β=.66, 
p=.008; for SW: β=.62, p=.011). Finally, the correlation between implicit and explicit 
measures was, on the whole, not moderated by self-activation, as reflected in non 
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significant two-way interactions between self-activation and IAT score (all p‟s >.526) 
when predicting the four explicit stereotype measures. Furthermore, there were non-
significant three-way interactions involving Concern (p‟s >.457 for PC, SC and SW), 
although there was a marginal effect for PW (β=.48, p=.071). A further probing of 
this effect revealed a nonsignificant tendency for an interaction between IAT and 
Concern under conditions of self-activation (β=.61, p=.083). Simple slope analyses 
revealed no significant effects at low, medium, and high values of Concern (all p‟s 
>.366). 
General Discussion 
The results of the four studies taken together provide support for our hypothesis. 
Using different methods and focusing on different domains, a self-activation 
manipulation has been shown to increase the predictive validity of the IAT. We will 
focus the remainder of this paper on some implications of these results.  
Theoretical foundations of the IAT 
In the last few years empirical evidence concerning the IAT has rapidly 
accumulated. Fewer studies have investigated the underlying mechanisms, typically 
focusing on cognitive accounts of the processes involved in the IAT score (e.g., 
Rothermund & Wentura, 2004) or on contextual effects (e.g., Mitchell, Nosek, & 
Banaji, 2003). The studies presented herein have tested a key foundational assumption 
of the IAT, namely that it reflects associations stored in the SKS structure. An 
implication of this assumption is that the IAT can be more predictive of relevant 
behaviors when it is gauged in a context with a heightened self. The results have 
confirmed this hypothesis and therefore support the theoretical rationale underlying 
the IAT. In other words, the effects of the self-activation manipulation show that the 
IAT score contains valid variance and not just content-free cognitive processes (that 
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from this perspective could be classed as method variance, cf. Mierke & Klauer, 
2003). These results converge with recent empirical evidence showing that content-
free cognitive accounts such as task-switching costs, salience effects, and figure-
ground asymmetries cannot fully explain the composition of the IAT scores (e.g., 
Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2005). In fact, the self-activation manipulation is 
orthogonal to all these accounts of cognitive processes in the IAT. 
Mechanisms 
The results of the four studies have also provided interesting information 
concerning potential mechanisms underlying the effects of self-activation on the IAT. 
Note that the effects of the self-activation manipulations are entirely in terms of 
variances. It should be highlighted that for all 4 studies the mean IAT scores do not 
differ significantly due to the self-activation manipulation. While at first this result 
may appear surprising, we believe that it is fully consistent with the mechanism of 
self-activation and the SKS assumption. The predictive validity of any measure 
depends on the portion of valid variance that is shared by the predictor and the 
criterion. This variance is entirely insensitive to changes in the mean values. The only 
thing that matters is that the individual ranking in the measure more accurately 
reflects the differences in the strength of associations as represented in the SKS of 
different individuals. It follows that the self-activation manipulation should have an 
effect in terms of covariances (e.g., correlation between IAT and criteria) and not 
necessarily in terms of means, as we have found in the four studies. 
Importantly, in three of the four studies the effects of self-activation have been 
shown to be unique to the associative structures that underlie the IAT. The effects 
were neither present for, nor mediated by, explicit attitudes, and there was no 
evidence of an increased correlation between implicit and explicit measures due to 
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self-activation. This would suggest that self-activation primarily renders more salient 
the associative evaluation but does not necessarily activate explicit cognitions and 
propositional evaluations. There are a number of additional considerations that can be 
prompted by this finding. First, note that the correlations between IAT and explicit 
attitudinal measures have ranged from significant to nonsignificant. We believe that 
this outcome reinforces our idea that using explicit attitudes as criteria to judge the 
quality of an implicit measure is a red herring. Once again, the focus could be more 
fruitfully placed on the unique predictive validity of the IAT and not on the 
convergent validity between measures, which is mostly a descriptive piece of 
information (cf. Perugini, 2005a,b). If anything, all else being equal, two measures 
that are more correlated are less likely to contribute unique variance to predict 
relevant criteria. Second, note that our results imply that self-activation can activate 
associative evaluations without necessarily also activating the corresponding 
propositional evaluations. Of course, the results do not rule out the possibility that 
self-activation can also work at the propositional level. Only further research can 
increase understanding of this specific aspect. Finally, and consequential to the 
previous point, our results imply that the self-activation manipulation can be 
distinguished from the Personalized-IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004). This is a modified 
IAT that reduces the relative weight of extra-personal associations, and therefore 
increases the weight of the personal associations that reflect one‟s attitude, in the IAT 
score. Their modification consists of changing the valence dimension and therefore 
basically adopting a speeded evaluative task (“I like” vs. “I don‟t like”) in place of the 
original categorization task (“positive” vs. “negative”). However, this procedure relies 
on systematically producing a stronger association between associative and 
propositional evaluations. Indeed, the authors use the increased correlation (compared 
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to the standard IAT) with explicit attitudes as evidence of the superiority of their 
paradigm.  
Optimal testing 
The four studies that we have presented suggest some conditions that can 
increase predictive validity and therefore can represent optimal testing conditions. 
The motor responses required in the IAT are affected by increased accessibility of 
self-related knowledge achieved with the self-activation manipulation. The specific 
temporal procedural sequence should be highlighted. In all studies, the self-activation 
manipulation was always performed immediately before the IAT measure and not 
during the whole experimental session (e.g., by using a room with a mirror) or after 
the measure and before the behavior or dependent variable (e.g., by using a priming 
manipulation). Therefore, the increase in predictive validity cannot be attributed to the 
behavior becoming aligned to the pre-existing attitudes as a consequence of increased 
self-focus (cf. Pryor et al., 1977). The manipulation directly affects the IAT and can 
be understood in a more general sense as additional evidence of the influence of 
contextual factors on implicit measures. However, unlike most other studies, what has 
been shown here is that the effect of self-activation is on the link between predictor 
(IAT) and criterion. In other words, the effects of self-activation are in terms of 
increasing the relationship between IAT and the relevant criteria to be predicted by 
affecting the portion of valid variance contained in its score.  
Conclusions 
In this contribution we have shown that increasing self-activation can have a 
significant impact on a subsequent IAT task. Although we have focused on IATs 
measuring implicit attitudes, it is possible that the findings generalize to other types of 
mental representations (e.g., self-concepts, non-evaluative stereotypes) as well as to 
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other types of paradigms (e.g., Extrinsic Affective Simon Task, De Houwer, 2003). 
Future studies will be needed to establish this generalizability. The impact of self-
activation is in terms of changing the portion of valid variance and not in terms of 
affecting the mean IAT scores per se. As a consequence, the resulting IAT can be 
more predictive of relevant behaviors and choices. Future studies will be needed to 
clarify the specific mechanisms involved, to further define the boundary conditions of 
the effect, and to refine the obtained effects so as to increase understanding of the 
theoretical foundations of the IAT and of its optimal testing conditions. 
 
Ontological test of the IAT   33 
 
References  
Back, M.D., Schmukle, S.C., & Egloff, B. (2005). Measuring Task-Switching Ability 
in the Implicit Association Test. Experimental Psychology, 52, 167-179. 
Bodenhausen, G. V. (1988). Stereotypic biases in social decision making and 
memory: Testing process models of stereotype use. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 55, 726-737. 
Brewer, M.B., & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is the “we”? Levels of collective identity 
and self representations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 83-
93. 
Carver, C.S., & Scheier, M.F. (1978). Self-focusing effects of dispositional self-
consciousness, mirror presence, and audience presence. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 36, 324-332. 
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2003). Applied multiple 
regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences (3rd ed). Hillsdale, 
USA: Erlbaum. 
Crandall, C.S., & Eshleman, A. (2003). A Justification–Suppression Model of the 
expression and experience of prejudice. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 414-446. 
Dasgupta, N., McGhee, D. E., Greenwald, A.G., & Banaji, M. R. (2000). Automatic 
preference for White Americans: Ruling out the familiarity explanation. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 316-328. 
De Houwer, J. (2001). A structural and process analysis of the Implicit Association 
Test. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 443-451. 
De Houwer, J. (2003). The extrinsic affective Simon task. Experimental Psychology, 
50, 77-85. 
Dijksterhuis, A., & Van Knippenberg, D. (2000). Behavioral indecision: Effects of 
Ontological test of the IAT   34 
 
self-focus on automatic behavior. Social Cognition, 18, 55-74. 
Dunton, B. C., & Fazio, R. H. (1997). An individual difference measure of motivation 
to control prejudiced reactions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 
316-326. 
Eichstaedt, J., & Silvia, P.J. (2003). Noticing the self: Implicit assessment of self-
focused attention using word recognition latencies. Social Cognition, 21, 349-
361. 
Fazio, R. H. (1990). Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behavior: The 
MODE model as an integrative framework. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology (Vol. 23, pp. 75-109). New York: Academic 
Press. 
Fiske, S.T., Cuddy, A.J., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002).  A model of (often mixed) 
stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived 
status and competition.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 878-
892.  
Greenwald, A.G., Banaji, M.R., Rudman, L.A., Farnham, S.D., Nosek, B.A., & 
Mellott, D.S. (2002). A unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-
esteem, and self-concept. Psychological Review, 109, 3-25. 
Greenwald, A.G., McGhee, D.E., & Schwartz, J.K.L. (1998). Measuring individual 
differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480. 
Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the 
Implicit Association Test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 197-216. 
Ontological test of the IAT   35 
 
Home Office (2005). Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System 2004: A 
Home Office publication under Section 95 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1991. 
London, UK: Home Office.  
Hull, J.G., Slone, L.B., Meteyer, K.B., & Matthews, A.R. (2002). The 
Nonconsciousness of Self-Consciousness. Journal of Personality & Social 
Psychology, 83, 406-424. 
Institute of Alcohol Studies (2005). Drinking in Great Britain. St Ives, UK. 
Maison, D., Greenwald, A.G., & Bruin, R. (2001). The Implicit Association Test as a 
measure of implicit consumer attitudes. Polish Psychological Bulletin, 2, 61-79. 
Macrae, C.N., Bodenhausen, G.V., & Milne, A.V. (1998). Say no to unwanted 
thoughts: self-focus and the regulation of mental life. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 74, 578-589. 
Mierke, J., & Klauer, K.C. (2003). Method-specific variance in the Implicit 
Association Test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 1180-1192. 
Mitchell, J.P., Nosek, B.A., & Banaji, M.R. (2003). Contextual variations in implicit 
evaluation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 132, 455-469. 
Nosek, B.A., Banaji, M.R., & Greenwald, A.G. (2002). Math = Male, Me = Female, 
therefore Math = Me. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 44-59. 
Olson, M.A., & Fazio, R.H. (2004a). Reducing the influence of extra-personal 
associations on the Implicit Association Test: Personalizing the IAT. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 653-667. 
Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2004b). Trait inferences as a function of automatically-
activated racial attitudes and motivation to control prejudiced reactions. Basic 
and Applied Social Psychology, 26, 1-11. 
Ontological test of the IAT   36 
 
Perugini, M. (2005a). Predictive models of implicit and explicit attitudes. British 
Journal of Social Psychology, 44, 29-45. 
Perugini, M. (2005b). Commentary on “Using implicit tasks in attitude research: a 
review and a guide” by Alexa Spence. Social Psychological Review, 7, 21-24. 
Perugini, M., & Gallucci, M. (2006). Order Analysis in counterbalanced measures 
and experimental designs. Unpublished manuscript. 
Poehlman, T. A., Uhlmann, E., Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (2005). 
Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of 
predictive validity. Unpublished manuscript. 
Pryor, J.B., Gibbons, F.X., Wicklund, R.A., Fazio, R.H., & Hood, R. (1977). Self-
focused attention and self-report validity. Journal of Personality, 45, 513-527. 
Roefs, A., & Jansen, A. (2002). Implicit and explicit attitudes toward highfat foods in 
obesity. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 111, 517–521. 
Rothermund, K., & Wentura, D. (2001). Figure-ground asymmetries in the Implicit 
Association Test. Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie, 48, 94-106. 
Rothermund, K., & Wentura, D. (2004). Underlying processes in the Implicit 
Association Test: Dissociating salience from associations. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 139-165. 
Silvia, P.J. (2002). Self-awareness and emotional intensity. Cognition and Emotion, 
16, 195-216. 
Silvia, P. J., & Eichstaedt, J. (2004). A self-novelty manipulation of self-focused 
attention for Internet and laboratory experiments. Behavior Research Methods, 
Instruments, and Computers, 36, 325-330. 
Stapel, D.E., & Tesser, A. (2001). Self-activation increases social comparison. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 742-750. 
Ontological test of the IAT   37 
 
Towles-Schwen, T., & Fazio, R. H. (2003). Choosing social situations: The relation 
between automatically- activated racial attitudes and anticipated comfort 
interacting with African Americans. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
29, 170-182. 
Wiers, R.W., Woerden, N.V., Smulders F. T. Y., & de Jong, P.T. (2002). Implicit and 
explicit alcohol-related cognitions in heavy and light drinkers. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 111, 648-658. 
Wiers, R. W., Houben, K., Smulders, F. T. Y., Conrod, P. J., & Jones, B. T. (2005). 
To drink or not to drink: The role of automatic and controlled processes in the 
etiology of alcohol-related problems. In R. W. Wiers & A. W. Stacy (Eds.), 
Handbook of Implicit Cognition and Addiction. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publishers. 
 
Ontological test of the IAT   38 
 
Authors Note  
Correspondence concerning this manuscript should be addressed to Marco 
Perugini, Department of Psychology, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester 
CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom, Email: mperug@essex.ac.uk, Tel. 01206 874330, Fax. 
01206 873590. This work was partly supported by a UK Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) grant R000230104.  
 
Ontological test of the IAT   39 
 
 
Footnotes 
1
 Different accounts of the specific mechanisms underlying the IAT have been 
proposed (e.g., task-switching costs, Mierke & Klauer, 2003; stimulus-response 
compatibility, De Houwer, 2001; figure-ground asymmetries, Rothermund & 
Wentura, 2001). A discussion of these accounts is beyond the scope of this 
contribution, given that they do not challenge the assumption of the SKS but represent 
different explanations of how it translates into an IAT effect. 
2
 We would like to thank Rob Holland for kindly providing us the self-activation 
manipulation. 
3
 We would like to thank anonymous reviewers for suggesting that we investigate this 
issue. 
4
 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting to us this strategy of 
analysis. The results are qualitatively similar to analyzing the two dependent variables 
separately.  
5 This effect of order is a spurious result that does not have a substantial interpretation, 
because it suggests that the order of presentation is not balanced across groups. This is 
not the case as evidenced by the simple association statistics (B=-.111, p=.814). 
However, by including the order in the final equation, its effects are partialled out 
from the relationships between other variables and group membership. 
6
 Unfortunately, due to a mistake in the programming software, age and gender were 
not recorded. The sample was approximately balanced in terms of gender and with an 
age range between 19 and 25 years old. 
  
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for IAT and explicit attitude scores by experimental conditions in the 
four studies. 
 IAT (D-score)  
Explicit 
measures 
 Study 1 
 M SD  M SD 
Control -0.29 0.45  -0.55 1.53 
Self-Activation -0.28 0.39  -0.72 1.40 
 Study 2 
Control 0.42 0.66  0.21 1.91 
Self-Activation 0.42 0.66  0.45 1.66 
 Study 3 
Control 0.98 0.22  -2.78 1.41 
Self-Activation 0.91 0.31  -2.75 1.43 
 Study 4 
Control -0.20 0.33 PC -0.72 1.04 
   PW -0.52 1.10 
   SC -0.90 0.97 
   SW -0.51 1.00 
   CON 3.80 1.04 
Self-Activation -0.32 0.38 PC -0.45 0.78 
   PW -0.10 1.03 
   SC -0.86 0.84 
   SW -0.63 0.96 
   CON 3.45 1.01 
Note. PC: Personal Competence; PW: Personal Warmth; SC: Society Competence; SW: 
Society Warmth; CON: Concern with acting prejudiced  
  
Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Study 1: Simple slopes for self-activation and control groups for the IAT Alcohol 
and the drinking alcohol index (standardized scores).  
Figure 2. Study 2: Predicted probabilities of being an Arts student for self-activation and 
control groups as a function of the IAT Science (standardized scores).  
Figure 3. Study 3: Simple slopes for self-activation and control groups for the IAT Junk Food 
and the Unhealthy Eating index (standardized scores).  
Figure 4. Study 4: Simple slopes for the interaction between IAT Afro-Caribbean and guilt 
judgment in the self-activation (top) and control (bottom) conditions (standardized scores). 
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